The Stability Paradox in Central Asia by Baev, Pavel & Cooley, Alexander A.
10TH ANNIVERSARY MEETUP
3 QUARKS DAILY ADVERTISING
Visit our sponsors:
BE THE CHANGE THE
WORLD NEEDS
Get Your CHANGE on with a
cool BTC T-Shirt and you can
begin making a difference one
person at a time.
Tweet this!
Read more...
An account of Marjorie Abell’s
life, chronicling the many
carefree adventures she had in
her youth.
Read more...
PLEASE SUBSCRIBE TO 3QD
Subscription options:
1: $5 USD - monthly
 
If you would like to make a one
time donation in any amount,
please do so by clicking the "Pay
Now" button below. You may use
any credit or debit card and do
NOT need to join Paypal.
 
The editors of 3QD put in
hundreds of hours of effort each
month into finding the daily links
and poem, putting out the Monday
Magazine, administering the
Quark Prizes, arranging the DAG-
3QD Peace and Justice Symposia,
and doing the massive amount of
behind-the-scenes work which
goes into running the site.
If you value what we do, please
help us to pay our editors very
modest salaries for their time and
cover our other costs by
subscribing above.
We are extremely grateful for the




« Caveats to Cooley's Argument | Main | The Elusive Quest for Political Stability: Diverging Approaches by the United States,
Russia, and China in Central Asia and Beyond »
Monday, September 16, 2013
THE STABILITY PARADOX IN CENTRAL ASIA
by Pavel Baev
In the 22 years long post-Soviet period, Central Asia has remained far more stable than standard risk
analysis would predict, given the intensity of internal tensions and disagreement between external
impacts. Alex Cooley demonstrates convincingly the deep differences between the US, Russia and China
in defining what “stability” in this geographically land-locked and politically anti-modern region is
about; he is also absolutely right in arguing that these differences do not amount to direct competition,
for which the cliché “New Great Game” has long been coined – and never made any sense. He may be
not quite correct, however, reducing the emphasis on “stability” to a “convenient rhetorical exercise”.
What is really odd about these three policies is that each of them is based on a particular definition of
“stability” – and is executed in a way that is not compatible with it. This incompatibility of the
proclaimed aims and employed means constitutes a “stability paradox”, which is set to acquire a
dramatic character as the interplay between various conflicts in the region escalates, while the regimes
are fast approaching their respective expiration dates.
Starting with the US, we can see that this paradox cuts deeper than just sacrificing the compromised
“democracy promotion” for the access to the infrastructure supporting the Northern Distribution
Network. The fundamental premise of the US strategic assessment is that stability in Central Asia could
only be achieved through the transformation of the corrupt authoritarian regimes towards what Cooley
calls “responsive governance”, as well as through building a regional security system with the support of
the European NATO allies and the EU. In reality, all efforts at fostering cooperation between Central
Asian states have long been abandoned as useless, while the joint work with the allies is centered on
securing safe withdrawal from Afghanistan. The EU has lost whatever “soft power” it tried to project
and accepted its inability to play even a supportive role in Central Asia. The pragmatic approach of the
Obama administration to doing security business with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan directly contributes to
consolidation of the despotic regimes (Cooley’s term “normative regression” appears rather academic for
this ugly process). This is completely at cross-purposes with the proposition for encouraging democratic
reforms, moderating corruption and curtailing narco-trafficking.       
Russia has no doubt about identifying stability in Central Asia with continuation of the ruling regimes,
obviously reflecting on the domestic ideological dogma that only the “verticality of power” created by
President Vladimir Putin holds the country from collapsing into anarchy and disintegration. Contrary to
this article of faith, Moscow orchestrated the coup against the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan in April
2010, stopped abruptly importing gas from Turkmenistan in April 2009, thus putting in peril
Berdymuhammedov’s regime, and picked quite a few quarrels with Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan,
which constitutes the key link in the chain of despotic regimes in the region. Russia also puts a strong
emphasis on the strengthening of regional security system structured first of all by the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and other institutions, including the Shanghai Cooperation
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Organization (SCO). This institution-building falls far short of “an almost demonstrative obsession with
projecting influence” (as Cooley argues). It has provided for plenty of high-level networking but for very
little hard substance. Russia has never put serious resources behind this political aim and is not building
sufficient military muscle for performing convincingly the role of “stability provider”. Its failure to
intervene into the Osh riots in summer 2010, was caused by the shortage of projectable power, and no
“rapid deployment corps” will spring to life in the course of badly mismanaged military reform.
China associates “stability” in Central Asia with deterring and suppressing the “three evils” of terrorism,
extremism and separatism, but Beijing resolutely rejects any intention to intervene into a crisis caused by
a manifestation of one of these “evils”. It also refrains from providing targeted support to the ruling
regimes in building capacity for combating these threats, leaving this job to Russia, which stages some
exercises but puts very little real effort into the hard work. China also derives “stability” from economic
development, which sounds very reasonable, but in fact, its payments for imported raw materials and aid
programs promote corruption and inequality rather than small business growth. At the same time, the
inflow of Chinese imported goods and traders chokes local industries and disrupts traditional bazaars,
which generates economic tensions rather than prosperity. China can provide certain political protection
for the Central Asian rulers in exterminating the opposition, as it did for Karimov’s regime after the
Andijan massacre in May 2005, but it is not seen as a reliable “enforcer” of despotic law and order.
What makes it problematic for all three great powers to continue elaborating their respective parts of this
security paradox is the schedule for withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Afghanistan.
Moscow, for that matter, is absolutely certain that the Karzai regime has about the same chance to cling
to power as the Najibullah regime had after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in early 1989. The Kremlin
expects that the escalation of violent chaos in Afghanistan would scare the rulers of Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan and even Kazakhstan into begging for Russian protection, which may or may not come
true, but even if it did, the capacity to seal the 2,000 km long border is non-existent. The US has lost
credibility as a leading conflict manager and nation-builder, but it has also lost interest in the wider
Caspian area, which a decade ago appeared to be of paramount geopolitical and petro-political
importance. It is difficult to figure out where the strategic thinking in Beijing about the conflict interplay
between Afghanistan and Central Asia is going, and it is hardly far-fetched to suggest that China has no
clue. 
It is counter-intuitive to observe that the spectacular turmoil in the greater Middle East since the start of
2011 has had no discernible resonance in Central Asia, but it would have been absurd to conclude that
the corrupt presidents-for-life are not destined to share Hosni Mubarak’s fate. Whichever goes first,
Russia’s interpretation of “stability” as prolongation of the sagging authoritarian regimes will be
shattered (unless street protests in Moscow would cancel it before). China would have to face its
powerlessness in deterring the “evil” of extremism, but the US would hardly have reasons to rejoice over
the breakthrough in democratization as jihad and pogrom would blend and give a new meaning to the
tired term “failed state”. Whatever meaning is ascribed to the notion of “stability”, the external powers
that have been proclaiming their commitment to upholding it and acting in complete disregard of this
commitment, would have to learn how the word “khalas”, which now rocks Cairo and Tunis, sounds in
Uzbek and Kazakh.
* * *
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